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Evaluation INTRODUCTION
The following interesting and hard1y ever addressed problem shall be the object of short analysis in the following lines. Assume that two (or more) states have accepted the same obligation by ratifying or acceding to two (or more) different treaties, which contain substantially the same rule. Are these states bound inter se by the rule they assumed through different treaties or are they not so bound?
As far as I see, the question has been addressed only twice, in a short contribution of D. Dic ke 1 and in a sort of rebu ttal published by D. Ciobanu. 2 The question was raised by these two writers in the context of the rule which grants jurisdiction to the tl ag state in cases of collision or other incident of navigation of a ship on the high seas. This rule was contained in two different Conventions: first, in the Gene va Convention on the High Seas ( 1958); and second, in the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to Penal Jurisdiction in Matters of Collision or other Incidents of Navigation (1952) . Italy was a party to the first convention, while Greece was a party only to the latter. There was moreover no renvoi from one convention to the other, nor any other type of formallink between the two. Was the rule on collisions, the two states had substantially agreed to be bound by, applicable in the case of a collision involving ships of the two states mentioned?
D. Dicke answered in the affirmative. For him, there was a rule of customary international law according to which there was, in such cases, a sort of collateral treaty between the two states: 'The two govenunents have accepted one and the same solution of a problem of international law, and have in effect declared that this will be the law binding on both nations, subject to reciprocity by the other State involved. ' 3 On the other hand, D. Ciobanu denied the existence of such a customary rule. For him, the treaty remains a compact between the parties having ratified the instrument without any possibility, de lege lata, to open up its applicability to what are formally third states. 4 It is apparent that the line of argument of D. Dicke is more substance-oriented and teleological, while the argument of D. Ciobanu is more formai and strict.
It appears that the question deserves some further elaboration. There might be more situations than thought at first sight, involving this problem, especially if one takes account of the rapid expansion of treaty obligations. Thus, for example, the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993 5 contains prohibitions developing those already contained in the Geneva Gas Protocol of 1925. 6 Rati- fication and accession among the two texts is not identical, and therefore our problem could weil arise.
. THE SCOPE AND CONTEXT O F THE QUESTION
Before it is possible to argue on the intimate s ubstance of the point raised, it is necessary to acldress a series of preliminary points delimiting its scope and context.
2.1
The existence of an equal obligation
First of ali, it must obviously be de tennined whether there is at ail a s ubstantially equal obligation. T hi s is a question of interpretation. Severa! situations may arise.
Primo, it is po ssible th at the obligation incurred is ide ntical (eventually lexically copied) in both cases on the face of the text. T his situation would appear to be clear and simple.
Secundo, it is also possible that one obligation is formulated in somewhat broader terms, so that it is ak.in to a lex generalis w ith respect to the other obligation, which is more close to a lex specialis. In these cases, there is on! y pmtia l identity. Or there mighl be partial coïncide nce al so a mong two rules placed on the same level of generality or s peciality . The question at first sig ht seems to be if there is a comrnon obligation to the lesser extent in which the two rules coïncide. This is a variant of our initial questi o n, but it may involve different legal and policy proble ms. T hus, it is obv ious that the definition of the common denominator of the two rul es is a questi on of constructive interpretation -and it might be thus more diffic ult to say that the two states have thus agreed to be bound by cross-treaties . Moreover, accepting a general rule might be Jess committal (as it might also be more committal) than acceding to a special rule, and thus it mig ht be difficult to speak of a common obligatio n in our sense at ali.
F ina lly, exceptions or qualifications to the rule may weaken the cotnmon ground to a breaking-point. Consider three s ituations: (1) Convention A says that the production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons is prohibited ; Convention B says that the production and stockpiling of some defined chemical weapons (e.g., asph yxiating weapons) is prohibited. Tt mi ght in this case be argued that the common denominator, the prohibition and stockpiling of asphyxiating chemical weapons, is prohibited. also into account the principle of uti possidetis. The coffilnon ground is here less certain, since the different hierarchy of the methods and rules to be used is indicating also sorne substantially different course chosen. (3) Convention A says that the States Parties accept the principle of aut dedere aut iudicare for a series of mentioned crimes; Convention B says that the States Parties accept the principle of aut dedere aut iudicare for a series of mentioned crimes (assume even that they coïncide with those of Convention A), but subject to a qualification by the extraditing state of ' political crimes' for which extradition may be refused. In this case it would be difficult to speak of a substantially equal obligation of judging or extraditing, because of the exception relating to political crimes. To say that the 'aut dedere aut iudicare' -rule represents a coffilnon denominator would be artificial, even if in both cases there is sorne degree of commitment to it, strong or weak. The pUt·pose of the preceding considerations is to show that the question of the same obligation in such cases is a delicate one, to be solved by close contextual analysis.
Tertio, further specifie problems may arise: e.g., if the obligation purportedly common appears in one convention formulated as a rule, while in the other it appears formulated as an exception or a qualification. In such cases, it will hardly be possible to speak of a common rule.
The problem is further complicated by reservations. It is only in a forgetful first glanee that we look at a multilateral treaty as something unitary, as a series of objective and invariable rules being set out in the text. In fact, multilateral conventions may be fragmented in a long series of bilateral relationships by way of reservations entered when signing, ratifying or acceding. Thus, if we want to be sure that two states have assumed the same obligation under two different treaties, we have to take into considerations also the reservations they may have entered, with the effect of modifying or excluding certain treaty obligations in their application to them. It is not the printed provision of the treaty which matters, but the obligation covered by the real assent of the state. Sornetimes, reservations may clearly destroy the basis of a common obligation; other times, however, there rnight be room for interpretation, with difficulties along the lines indicated above.
A sirnilar problem may arise if the obligation or right at stake (which is to be applied extra-conventionally) is linked with other provisions in the treaty in which it is found, provisions which are not to be found equally in the other treaty. It is nowadays a coffilnonplace that the provisions within a treaty are inter-1inked, pursuing an overall purpose. A treaty is a whole, not a series of provisions standing in isolation. This is the very basis for the generally accepted method of contextual interpretation of treaties. The situation is clear if the provision at stake makes expressly references to other provisions in the treaty. In such a case, its extra-conventional reach might be lirnited or frustrated. But a provision may be linked with other aspects of its 'home' -treaty also by other means, without any express aclmowledgement. This again is a matter of interpretation, and its result may be a limitation of its capacity to be considered an 'equal obligation' in the sense of our problem.
A 7 seems impossible, the extra-conventional reach of a provision might again be curtailed. Think for example of the Convention against genocide of 1948, where the provision on the mandatory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice was in 1951 a hotly debated point in the observations of the USSR and socialist states on the one hand, and in those of the Western states on the other. The first maintained that the jurisdiction of the ICJ was a subordinate and merely procedural aspect not essential to the abject and purpose of the Convention, while the Western states maintained that the effet utile of the compact turned essentially on the availability of enforcement by the Court. 8 Again it is a question of interpretation -and often of a delicate one -to decide if and to what extent such a sine qua non-link exists.
A last problem to be mentioned is the following: it rnight be necessary not to stop short considering the black-letter text of a treaty, in order to determine if there is an 'equal obligation' , sin ce that text rnight have been modified by subsequent practice, among ali States Parties, or among sorne of them (to which the state interesting us for our problem rnight belong). If it is general international law which evolved on a matter, it might be possible to postulate that the same evolution took place in both treaties coverin g the same subject. Consider for example the question of the 'sacred trust of civilisation' contained in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which the International Court found to have changed since 1920 in the light of the developments of the right of self-determination and decolonisation. 9 If such a term were used in different treaties, it would be appropriate to extend to ali of them the ruling of the Court, pace the relative effect of its judgments. If however the subsequent practice is strictly a matter inter partes, the obligations in the two treaties under consideration will differ notwithstanding an identical text.
These rema.rks may be enough to show how many intricate problems already arise at the levet of determination if there is a substantively 'equal obligation' between the two states.
2.2
The role of customary international law
Second, the situation we are faced with wiU differ profoundly with respect to the question if the obligation at stake is part of customary international law or not. If the rule contained in two or more different treaties is part of general customary in ternational law, it will be binding upon the states qua customary rule and the question of cross-conventional application imagined by D. Dicke will not arise. Wi th the modern tendency to postulate expansively the existence of customa.ry rules, 10 it might weil be that the existence of a ru le in different conventions be taken as basis for affirming quite quickly its customary nature. But this is a question of legal policy and not of legal construction. A specifie question arises if the two conventions containing the substantially same obligation join together to create a universal law. Consider for example that there are 60 states in the world, and that 50 states are bound by Convention A, while the other 10 states are bou nd by Convention B. Both Conventions contain the same obligation. By bringing together both conventions, one ends up with a rule adhered to by ali states of the world. Now, it might be possible to treat such a rule automatically as being customary, aparl fro m any practice, because it is adhered to by ail states of the world. Thus, it would be possible to say today that ail the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 on humanitarian law are customary, sin ce aH the states of the world ra ti fied these conventions. Apart from thi s course, it might also be possible, more prudently, to speak of a unive.rsal non-customary law. The situation described above, where it is the addition of both conventions which bears out the universality, has already arisen in history. In the 1930', ali states in the world but four of them (Bolivia, El Salvador, Uruguay and Argentina) 11 were bound by the Briand-Kellogg Pact of renunciation of war of 1928. The fo ur states not parties to that treaty were bound by the parallel Anti-War Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliati on (Saavedra-Lamas) of 1933 concluded in Rio. The obligation not to resort to war as an instrument of national policy (aggressive war) was a common rule to them. 12 Assume for the sake of argument that the obligation of non-recourse to aggressive war was not customary at that time. It would ali the same have appeared reasonable to apply the rule also to the states not bound by the same treaty in their relations inter se, since the obligation reflected a uni versai and supreme policy choice. This statement might hold true for ali such cases of 'universal' obligations or rules.
2.3
The distinction between bilateral and multilateral conventions A further element of great importance is the distinction between multilateral and bilateral conventions. Bilateral treaties are concluded intuitu personae. The lirnited scope of their persona! reach is part of the game. Consider for example investment protection treaties. Sorne states, like Switzerland or England, have concluded almost hundred of them. But it would be impossible for Switzerland to argue that England is bound with respect to it by the same rules, except to the extent of customary law or ad hoc admissions. Our research must thus be lirnited to multilateral treaties of lawmaking nature. It is there that the extraconventional reach of a provision, as indicated, may be of interest. For it is possible, in such cases, to argue that the treaty has a general outlook, not limited intuitu personae.
IS THERE A BINDING OBLIGATION A CROSS THE TREATIES?
If we now suppose to be in possession of an 'equal obligation' set out in two different multilateral lawmaking treaties and suitable for extra-conventional transposition, should we allow the idea of binding force among two states not parties to the same convention, or should we reject it? Two !ines of argument are imaginable. Let us set them out each one in its own logic, before taking position on them.
3.1
The formai line of argument Formally, it is possible to argue that there is no practice on the matter and thus that any customary rule, able to fumish a basis for binding a state which has not consented to a collateral obligation flowing from the sum of bath treaties, is lacking. Moreover, it could be said that treaties are a source based on the consent or the will of states; to be binding, that will must be clearly (albeit not always expressly) formulated. Now the first rule with respect to treaties is that the States Parties assume obligations only as against other treaty parties: treaties create only relative rights and duties ad personam, among the 'members' to the system. ln other words, the main rule of treaty law with respect to the persona] scope of application is that only parties may be obliged or may benefit from them (pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt). This fundamental rule was
constantly insisted upon in international practice and particularly in international judicial practice. 13 Thus, the States Parties did not envisage to be bound possibly as against states non-parties; theil· will was 'closed ', accepting reciprocity of treaty rights and duties only within the compass of parties. There is no open engagement erga plures but only a closed engagement erga partes. Thus, e.g., if a third state accepts all the rights and obli gations of the treaty but still refuses to become a party toit, a State Party to the treaty, notwithstanding the perfect reciprocity created by the third state, is not bound to apply the treaty to that state. In the same vein, a state would not be bound to accept common t.reaty obligations with a state not having become a party to the same convention, whichever its identical obligations un der another treaty. For the identity must be double: ratione materiae and ratione personae. If only the obligation is equal, but not the persona! scope of application, it is imposs~ble to speak legally of an ' equal' obligation in the sense of treaty law.
3.2
The substantial line of argument Substantially, it is possible to argue that international law in general and t.reaty law in particular are not formalistic but are centred upon the cardinal idea of material acceptance of an obligation, in wbichever way this may be performed. In our case, the two states have accepted to be bound by the same obligation as against a non specified number of other states, since they have considered that the rule at stake is the most convenient or equitable way to deal with a specifie question. By becorning party to an open lawmaking treaty setting out that rule, they implicitly expressed their wish to be able to apply that rule as against as many states in the world as possible, hoping that they would accept the same rule by becoming parties to the same treaty. From the teleological point of view, it cannot matter that the acceptance of the same rule did not happen as foreseen, namely by accession to the same convention. The hypothetical will of the state must be construed to cover ali cases in which another state committed itself to the same rule, since that is precisely the rule which the first state wants to see applied as generally as possible. Thus, it is possible, in ali cases in which perfect reciprocity is assured, to construe a collatera l treaty among the two States Parties to the different treaties containing the same rule. The content of this collateral t.reaty is to render applicable, inter partes, the said rule. Such a collateral treaty could be presumed by law, unless one of the two states shows that on the special circumstances of the case it would be unreasonable or impossible to assume the existence of a will to accept the applicability of the rule in 14 Moreover, this course would be consonant with the general principle of good faith, which seeks to protect the legitimate expectations of the States Parties to legal relationships. 15 It would mean that a state is able to rely on the representation of the other to commit itself to a certain rule in the context of certain facts. Unless there are special reasons, it would be odd to permit that other state to deny the applicability of a rule to which it represented to adhere -and the commitment to an open lawmaking treaty must be construed as such a commitment going beyond the treaty sphere.
Alternatively, the representation of the states by participating in their respective treaties could also be construed as two unilateral acts of acceptance of the rule, parallel to the acceptance as treaty commitment. These unilateral acts of acceptance of the rule would join together, with the effect of rendering applicable the rule at stake. At the end of the day this is a more adventurous way to construe a collateral agreement.
EVALUATION
The solution to the problem raised might weil be to avoid any single and rigid answer. The answer to be given would thus turn on the circumstances of the single case. This could also reftect the fact that this way of creating reciprocal obligations is certainly most uncommon. The evaluation on the specifie circumstances of the case would take account of a series of factors militating in the sense of admitting extended obligations or altematively against it. There does not seem as yet to be any presumption for or against that course. Thus, the lawapplyer would have to assess a series of objective and of subjective factors. For example:
(1) The state of customary international law. Even assuming that our rule is not customary (a necessary assumption) , 16 the tendency of state practice to push it to the leve! of a general rule is highly material. In effect, the more the rule at stake corresponds to the contemporary wishes and needs of the community of states, as evidenced by practice and statements, and the more the legal operator would be inclined to admit sorne extra-conventional reach of that rule. or if he deals with norms of great importance to the commun.ity of states. T h us, a part from the factor mentioned un der ( 1 ), the importance of the rule, in conjunction or not with a 'poussée coutumière', might be a material element to take account of. The example of the prohibition of the war of aggression contained in the Pacts of Paris and of Rio already mentioned, is illustrati ve of both aspects, (1) and (2). (3) The character of the rule itself may also be material in another sense. If the rule is a narrow and exceptional one, there is less room for analogies (the old rules are: exceptiones sunt stricta interpretationis; odiosa sunt restringenda). If conversely the rule is a broad, liberal and equitable one, its extension may be postulated more easily in order to reach a satisfactory result. (4) The will of the states when committing themselves to the rule. lt is possible that a state has made statements to the effect that it accepts the said rule because it considers that rule to be most convenient or equitable; that it desires to see that rule generally applicable; that it will commit itself strongly to that rule; that that rule corresponds to policy interests of that state; etc. All these factors strengthen the construction of sorne extra-conventional reach of the obligation. (5) The special relationship of the two states at stake. It might be easier to postulate some collateral agreement among to states that have close and friendly relationships, where confidence in any type of representation of the other state is particularly strong. Moreover, there may have been sorne declarations or courses of conduct among the two states, which might strengthen the argument for collateral application.
If the extra-conventional reach were finally adm itted, the legal construction would not pose insurmountable problems. A teleological interpretation centred on good faith could use the deviee of a collateral agreement between the two states. The fac t that this course does not yet correspond to current practice, because it is highly exceptional, does not however preclude legal imagination or indeed innovation. As Sir Hartley Shawcross, chief prosecutor at the Nuremberg trial of 1945 (and who died last year), proffered more than fifty years ago, the fact that something is done for the first ti me is not a sign of its legal weakness. If it is based on legal principle and meets a need of the community, it is a healthy development of the law. As Sir Hartley said: the first man against whom a trial for murder has been held could perh aps have complained that never before a court bad performed such a procedure. But this is inherent in a system of law not based on codification but based on practice-as is the case of international law.
